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Owen M. Fiss*
Growing up is a process of having one's heroes rendered less
inspiring. For me, Thurgood Marshall was the exception.
Almost twenty-five years ago I made the familiar high school trip
to Washington, D.C. My classmates and I took in all the monuments.
We even managed to catch a few minutes of the Supreme Court in
session. We entered in the middle of an oral argument, and though we
did not fully understand what was transpiring in the courtroom, no one
could miss the sense of drama. A tall black lawyer was addressing the
Court, and all eyes - set in a sea of white - were fixed on him.
The lawyer spoke with a very special eloquence. He was dig-
nified and proper, but his words were accessible to all. The formalisms
that so often mask the law and make it forbidding were gone. The case
was put in simple, clear, powerful words. These words were uttered
with patience, with a steel, almost icy serenity, yet beneath them was
an urgency, a longing, that could not help but move the Justices and
the audience. The moment was electrifying - it infused me with a
spirit and determination that helped shape my life, it captured the
nation. Afterward I learned that the case was called Brown v. Board of
Education and the lawyer Thurgood Marshall.
A decade later we met again, this time on a somewhat more direct
basis. The lawyer had recently become a judge, of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit, and I became his law clerk. I was given a
chance that was both extraordinary and risky, to work for a hero of my
youth - though, until now, I never dared to tell him how much he
meant to me. He is not that kind of person - he is open, always
joking, and warm, but with little tolerance for explicit displays of
sentiment ("knucklehead" is his favorite word of endearment).
The qualities I saw in the courtroom in the 1950s filled his
chambers in the 1960s, and there was more. There were his stories -
that conveyed to me the terror, the sacrifice, and, once in a while, even
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the joy of being a civil rights lawyer in the 1930s and 1940s, still a time
of the most crude and brutal racism. There were the daring moments
on the bench - when he "overruled" some Supreme Court prece-
dents, those, he said, of an earlier age and likely to be repudiated by
the Supreme Court itself whenever it got around to the task;1 or when
he questioned a decision of an even higher authority for the Second
Circuit - L. Hand. 2 There were also our disagreements over the cases
- extraordinary arguments, in which his vision of the Constitution
and my recently acquired education at the Harvard Law School - a
place then consumed by Wechsler's "neutral principles" - did not
exactly mesh. In time I learned, I learned a lot, about the law and about
him.
Thurgood Marshall has probably had the most stunning legal
career of the twentieth century - the lawyer in Brown, a turning point
in American jurisprudence; a judge of the Second Circuit; later the
Solicitor General of the United States; and still later a Supreme Court
justice. Clearly he was on the side of history (though that was not
apparent to all - his grandmother greeted his decision to study law
with an insistence that he learn to cook, so that he could be sure of a
job). But there was a cause more personal to the man, a vision of
American society that sees law as the central instrument of reform and
protection of human rights as the highest purpose of the Constitution.
This was the vision that led him to the NAACP and sustained him
through the harassment and defeats of his career. This was the vision
I United States exrel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844, 861-63 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied sub nomn. Mancusi v. Hetenyi, 383 U.S. 913 (1966) (criticizing Kring v.
Missouri, 107 U.S. 221 (1882), and Brantley v. Georgia, 217 U.S. 284 (1910)).
Hentenyi was cited approvingly by Justice Fortas in his dissent in Cichos v. Indiana, 385
U.S. 76, 81-82 (1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting); and Brantley was explicitly overruled in
Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 330 (1970).
2 See In re Sherman Plastering Corp., 346 F.2d 492, 495-96 (2d Cir. 1965)
(set-off in bankruptcy reorganization; disapproving of In re Neaderthal, 225 F. 38 (2d
Cir.) cert. denied, 238 U.S. 635 (1915)); United States ex rel. Martinez-Angosto v.
Mason, 344 F.2d 673, 686-88 (2d Cir. 1965) (procedural protections for deportation of
sailors jumping foreign ships; disapproving of United States ex rel. Perez-Varella v.
Esperdy, 285 F.2d 723,725 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 925 (1961)); Reid v.
Quebec Paper Sales & Transp. Co., 340 F.2d 34, 36-37 (2d Cir. 1965) (duty of
seaworthiness; questioning distinction posed by Judge Hand in Grillea v. United States,
232 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1956)).
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that found expression in his work as a civil rights lawyer and also as a
judge.
Thurgood Marshall's commitment to that vision was not shared
by all his colleagues on the Second Circuit. Now and then a civil rights
case came before that court in the 1964-65 term, the year of the
clerkship, and the Judge took his stand - in dissent. 3 A more frequent
area of disagreement centered on the rights of the individual in the
criminal process - Mapp v. Ohio,4 Gideon v. Wainwright,5 Fay v.
Noia, 6 and Escobedo v. Illinois7 (the stepping stone to Miranda v.
Arizona) .8 Some of the judges on the Second Circuit, particularly those
in positions of leadership in the bar and the academy, received these
decisions of the Warren Court only in the most grudging fashion.
Thurgood Marshall, on the other hand, insisted that these decisions be
taken at their full value - not in obedience to a higher authority, but
because they embodied the right principles of our constitutional order.
He took these stands repeatedly, and courageously, at some discomfort
- it is no fun for a new judge, one whose appointment took the Senate
almost a year to confirm, one with no ties to Wall Street, then the
spiritual center of the Second Circuit, repeatedly to raise his voice in
protest, against the prominent, the established, the recognized. He
spoke on behalf of the Supreme Court, true, but in the early 1960s that
institution was at the center of controversy and criticism - it needed
support and had little to confer. As it turned out, history was once
again on Thurgood Marshall's side, he moved on to be Solicitor Gen-
eral at the end of the year, giving up the tenure of his judgeship
because he too could not say "no" to LBJ.
3 People v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255, 275 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
977 (1965) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that demonstrators who disrupted traffic
to N.Y. World's Fair should be given opportunity to amend removal petitions and have
district court conduct full hearings); Ephraim v. Safeway Trails, Inc., 341 F.2d 815,
820 (2d Cir. 1965) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that a bus company that picked up
passengers in the New York Port Authority should be held liable for damages suffered
by a black woman in an incident that occurred in Georgia, at the instigation of his driver,
when she refused to change her seat, despite the fact that the incident occurred on the bus
of a connecting carrier.) ',
4 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
7 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
8 '4 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Last spring I took my daughters to Washington, D.C. We made a
stop at the Supreme Court, and I introduced them to Thurgood Mar-
shall, not in the courtroom, but now in his chambers. He was his usual
jovial self, yet beneath the surface, beneath the joking and the stories
(which were retold for my daughters), one could see the grandeur of
the man who had stood in the courtroom twenty-five years ago, with
that same sense of struggle and determination, now resisting the efforts
of the Burger Court to undo many achievements of Brown and the
Warren Court era. One could also see, and marvel at, his continued
capacity and effort to recharge a new generation, even though the
present state of the law could not have been for him a source of
satisfaction or optimism - so much that he stands for is in jeopardy.
That is why it is so fitting to honor Thurgood Marshall today. Not
because we are at another anniversary - he could not care less about
things like that (it pained him to sit for the sculpture Baltimore is
erecting for him, and not simply because it is so near the one the city
erected for its other Justice, Taney). Rather, because we are at a time
when there is a need to celebrate the personal qualities that Thurgood
Marshall exemplifies - courage sustained by a vision of the centrality
of human rights to our constitutional order. In honoring him we ex-
press the hope that his vision will once again be triumphant. We renew
his spirit and ours, and thus do what we can to make certain that
Thurgood Marshall will once again be on the side of history.
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